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n Hume’s Natural History of Religion, he finds two ques-
tions of utmost importance when studying religious be-
lief; they are (1) “its foundation in reason” and (2) “its 
origin in human nature.”1 Hume pursues the second path 
of inquiry, tracing the origins of polytheism and how that 
brought about monotheism.2 He does this not by looking at reli-
gious texts, but at historical texts. Spinoza on the contrary, in the 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, searches for the origins of belief us-
ing religious texts.3 Despite these contrary approaches, both 
Hume and Spinoza find that religious belief rests on the pas-
sions, specifically the passions of fear and hope.4 Contemporary 
neuroscience has begun to question Hume’s first path of in-
quiry—reason as a religious foundation5 —and started to vali-
date his and Spinoza’s assertion that belief rests on the passions.6  
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These findings suggest that to move toward an understand-
ing of religious belief, the second path is the correct one. 
In this paper I provide a two-pronged approach to an under-
standing of religious belief, as is rooted in human nature. The 
first prong is to understand how social custom plays a role in the 
passing down of religious belief. This is done by giving an analy-
sis of Mill’s account of custom in On Liberty, and then by arguing 
by analogy that those same attributes Mill accounts for are pre-
sent in religious belief. The second prong is to understand how 
social cognition plays a role in religious belief. This will be done 
by first explaining why religious believers find their particular 
religion more reasonable than other religions.7 The answer to 
this question should shed light on what makes religious belief 
different than religious disbelief, and form a cognitive model for 
religious belief. When I have finished my account of religious 
belief I will look back on the implications this has for Hume’s 
and Spinoza’s findings, as well as how this deals with an argu-




An Analysis of Mill 
 
In John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, he observes that when law-
makers gather, they create rules that appear to be “self-evident 
and self-justifying.”8 However, Mill claims this appearance of 
self-evidence is an illusion due to the “magical influence of cus-
tom.”9 By “magical influence of custom,” Mill means that people 
time and again find certain rules self-evident when they are 
ubiquitous in their society. In order for a proposition to be self-
evident it must be true without needing to be justified, that is, it 
automatically has warrant conferred upon it. Such lawmakers let 
an idea that has passed down from generation to generation in-
fluence the way they think, and ultimately what they think ap-
pears to be self-evident. Mill believes that rules should not be 
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like this and need to be justified because though such rules seem 
self-evident to a person who is a part of the specific custom in 
question, they are not self-evident among people outside of that 
custom.  
Mill goes on to state: 
 
The effect of custom…which mankind impose on one an-
other, is all the more complete because the subject is one 
on which it is not generally considered necessary that 
reasons should be given, either by one person to others, 
or by each to himself [emphasis added].10 
 
The subject Mill refers to here is “law making.” “Law making” is 
the process by which an individual or group of individuals cre-
ate rules (or, laws) for governing societies. Such an observation is 
fitting since during Mill’s time it was not common for one to 
need reasons as a means of justifying a law. This practice could 
be due to the desire to come up with first or starting principles 
that do not need to refer back to other reasons or principles for 
support, but should be used to build upon. For example, a start-
ing principle of laws could be free speech, from there one could 
derive a law such as, “People should be free to worship how 
they please,” or “There should be freedom of press,” etc. 
It is noteworthy to recognize that reasons are not only unnec-
essary for others, they’re also unnecessary for the person propos-
ing the rule. Mill states this is because, “People are accustomed 
to believe…that their feelings on subjects of this nature are better 
than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary.”11 Again, people 
tend to believe that when it comes to the particular area of law 
making, their feelings are better than reasons for deriving first 
principles. This is due to wanting to create foundational princi-
ples from which one can then derive other laws. Mill states: 
 
The practical principle which guides them to their opin-
ions on the regulation of human conduct is the feeling in 
each person's mind that everybody should be required to 
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act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would 
like them to act.12 
 
It is important to note Mill’s terminology here, where he 
states that it is the feeling the lawmaker has that everyone ought 
to act as the lawmaker sees fit, instead of giving reasons for the 
validity of the rule to be in place. The use of the word “feeling” 
marks a shift from objective to subjective, which can be used to 
avoid making falsifiable statements. Feelings are not falsifiable 
because they, like matters of taste, are subjective and cannot be 
proven wrong since people’s feelings are infallible. I cannot 
prove or disprove that someone feels a certain way, just as one 
cannot be wrong, for example, about the fact that he/she likes 
cherry pie or rock music. These are subjective states and cannot 
be independently adjudicated. Because of the infallibility of per-
sonal experiences and matters of taste, laws cannot be grounded 
in feelings; only reason can ground laws because independent, 
neutral third party arbiters can analyze and judge the validity of 
the lawmakers’ reasoning. 
Finally, Mill states that no one recognizes the standard they 
are holding is nothing but their personal opinion, unsupported 
by reasons. He states that such positions “can only count as one 
person’s preference,” and that if that person gives a reason for a 
position, it is simply trying to tie his/her opinion to others’ opin-
ion.13 Mill rightly notices that this “is still only many people’s 
liking instead of one,” therefore making such an appeal is simply 
trying to win by numbers.14 
 
An Analysis of Religion 
 
The following analysis frames my argument about custom’s 
influence over religious belief. First, I will explain what is meant 
by religion and religious beliefs. Second, I will show how reli-
gious beliefs are influenced by custom just as law making is. 
Steven Brutus, in his book Religion, Culture, History, looks at 
various common definitions of religion that have two consistent 
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ideas: Supernatural belief and worship.15 I will focus primarily 
on the supernatural aspect because many common definitions 
also use the word “spiritual,”16 a reference to “spirit,” which is 
immaterial, or again more than natural (or, super-natural). It is 
the supernatural aspect that determines what I term “religious.” 
Because of this, it is not unreasonable to attribute belief by faith 
to religion, that is, belief on the basis of no evidence.17 Since we 
have no evidence of the supernatural, any belief in it must be on 
the basis of no evidence. (There are some religions that do not fit 
this definition. In Reform Judaism, for instance, it is not neces-
sary to make supernatural claims or believe in a god. This paper 
only concerns religions that do.) With a definition of “religion” 
in place, the foundation for my argument should follow quite 
easily by reexamining Mill’s passage on law making;18 that is, by 
changing the subject from “law making” to “belief in x” where x 
is any given religious belief—from an entire doctrine or just a 
specific god or deity—it is easy to see that custom influences reli-
gious beliefs. 
In the first passage I quoted,19 Mill introduces his idea of cus-
tom as appearing to be self-evident. Believers will often see the 
tenants of their own faith as self-evident truths, which is due to 
the “illusion” of custom. If people are born in a predominantly 
Christian culture, for example, they are likely to see many Chris-
tian tenants as self-evident, especially if they were born within 
this particular religion. The same could be said about those born 
in a predominantly Muslim culture. This is not merely conjec-
ture. There is overwhelming evidence that children take their 
parents’ religious beliefs.20 Furthermore, Eaves, Hatemi, Prom-
Womley, and Murelle noted that not only does the phenomenon 
of belief transfer exist, but it is also primarily due to social influ-
ence.21 The result of being so ingrained in custom is that any-
thing outside of society seems unreasonable due to the obvious-
ness of the initial belief system.  
The next passage examines how custom influences law mak-
ing by observing how certain laws seem self-evident when they 
are not.22 Again, this observation by Mill can be applied to reli-
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gious belief because religious beliefs are sometimes considered 
self-evident.23 However, it is not the case that a particular reli-
gion is self-evident; otherwise everyone would be following that 
religion. The takeaway point is that when you are raised within 
a specific religious tradition, that religion appears self-evident 
because you develop your other ideas around that one system of 
thought.  
It is worth noting Mill’s observation that not only do law-
makers not need to give reasons for belief to others, but they also 
do not need to give reasons to themselves. This observation is 
noteworthy because if we take a religion like Christianity that 
states that human reason is unmatched by God (the story of Job 
comes to mind), then reasons (i.e. epistemic justifications) are not 
a necessary aspect of belief. However, some believers often give 
non-epistemic “reasons” for faith, which have more to do with 
feeling than with reason and evidence. These extra-
epistemological appeals are meant to establish the validity of the 
belief and mirror Mill’s observation about feeling over reason 
guiding the lawmakers. An example would be: people have faith 
because of how it makes them feel, or because of a type of appeal 
to emotion. For instance, continuing with Christianity, evange-
lizers often lead with the story of Jesus dying on the cross for our 
sins; this appeal to emotion creates a positive feeling for faith in 
God. The focus on feeling within religion can be backed up by 
research showing that, “Adopting religious beliefs depends on 
cognitive-emotional interactions.”24 Essentially, religious beliefs 
take part within brain networks that are also used for processing 
emotions. In addition, using the word “feeling” creates the infal-
libility problem, seen earlier in Mill.25 Religious beliefs are about 
the nature of how things truly are; if beliefs are grounded in feel-
ing, they can’t be proven or disproven, creating an issue with the 
verifiability of religious beliefs. Given this issue, faith is the only 
option left for holding these beliefs.  
Furthermore, we can see that believers manifest the idea that 
their belief system should be held by others and often argue 
based on the sheer number of believers in their system as reason 
Matthew Hernandez 24 
enough to believe.26 This is again in direct parallel to Mill’s state-
ments about people’s preference in law making, and the appeal 
to similar opinion among others. 
In my analysis, I have demonstrated that given the similari-
ties between law making, as described by Mill, and religious be-
liefs, custom has the ability to influence one to think something 
is self-evident when it actually is not, and that these subjects are 
not commonly expected to have reasons as justification for belief. 
In addition to the current research in the field, this adequately 




An Analysis of Belief 
 
In order to gain an understanding of the role social cognition 
plays in religious belief I will first attempt to answer why reli-
gious believers find their particular religion more reasonable 
than other religions.27 I will argue that this is the case because 
religious believers think about their religion socially while think-
ing about other religions analytically. This answer will effective-
ly house religious belief in social cognitive processes, which will 
then lead the way for a cognitive model of religious belief. This 
argument is as follows: 
 
1. If analytical (/critical) thinking promotes religious 
disbelief then believers are most likely not thinking 
about their belief analytically.  
2. Analytical thinking promotes religious disbelief.28 
3. Religious believers  are most  likely not thinking 
about their belief analytically. (from 1, 2) 
4. Religious belief takes places in social cognitive pro-
cesses.29 
5. If one does not accept a religious belief, he/she may 
be thinking about it analytically. (from 2) 
6. If one believes in a specific religion but denies all 
other religions, he/she must be thinking about his/
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her religion socially while thinking about other reli-
gions analytically. (from 2, 4, 5) 
7. There are religious believers that believe in a specif-
ic religion, but deny all other religions.30 
8. Religious believers think about their religion social-
ly while thinking about other religions analytically 
(from 6, 7) 
 
The first premise shouldn’t be problematic. If an activity pro-
motes religious disbelief then those who believe in religious 
propositions are not likely engaging in that activity. In this in-
stance I’m using analytical or critical thinking as the activity that 
promotes religious disbelief. I’m comfortable with either analyti-
cal or critical thinking because analytical thinking is the method-
ological aspect of critical thinking.31 The terms “most likely” are 
used because of the research by Gervais and Norenzayan, which 
shows how strong of an effect analytic thinking has on religious 
belief. For example, the mere act of viewing Rodin’s The Thinker 
as a way to initiate analytical thinking, “significantly promoted 
religious disbelief.”32 
The second premise will probably be met with conflict, but is 
based upon the aforementioned research, which employs a rig-
orous methodology. The third premise follows from the first and 
second due to modus ponens.  
Premise four is also based upon a study showing that reli-
gious belief is a part of “cognitive processes and brain networks 
used in social cognition.”33 That is, religiosity takes place in the 
networks of the brain that are a part of social processing. This, in 
addition to the other Gervais and Norenzayan research, sup-
ports premise five, “If one does not accept religious belief he/
she may be thinking about it analytically.”   
All of the previous premises act to build the conditional for 
premise six. If one believes in a specific religion but denies all 
other religions, he/she must be thinking of his/her religion so-
cially (Kapogiannis et al.), while denying other religions due to 
analytical thinking, since analytical thinking promotes disbelief 
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(Gervais & Norenzayan). There are those who believe in a specif-
ic religion while denying others.34 This successfully confirms the 
antecedent, which proves that the conclusion, “Religious believ-
ers think about their religion socially while thinking about other 
religions analytically,” must necessarily follow due to modus po-
nens.  
 
A Cognitive Model 
 
Accepting that religious believers think about their religion 
socially while thinking of other religions analytically leads to a 
new question: “Why aren’t religious believers thinking about 
their beliefs analytically?” My answer to this question will come 
by way of a cognitive model for religious belief, which I will pre-
sent now. 
Recent research shows that it is difficult to start thinking ana-
lytically about something one has only thought about socially, 
while also lending evidence to the proposition that there is a split 
between analytic and social cognition. In Jack et al., neuroscien-
tists show that one brain network is used primarily for social rea-
soning and a separate network is used for mechanical and logical 
reasoning.35 The former is the default mode network (DMN), 
which has been linked in numerous studies with social, emotion-
al, and moral processing.36 The latter is the task-positive network 
(TPN), which is the analytically active part of the brain. The rea-
son it is so hard to think analytically about something one has 
only thought about socially has to do with how these two net-
works interact. The study shows that when the DMN is active 
there is a negative corollary effect in the TPN. That is, when are-
as of the brain associated with the DMN are active, the areas as-
sociated with the TPN deactivate.37 The inverse is also true; 
when the TPN is active the DMN deactivates. When one is en-
gaged in standard social, emotional, and moral processing 
(DMN), the analytic part of the brain (TPN) functions less as the 
DMN sections function more, and vice versa.  
The research by Jack et al. shows just how the difference in 
thinking I have argued for actually exists in cognitive function-
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ing, making it the case that religious believers think about reli-
gions differently. In other words, it is more difficult for believers 
to interact with their own religion analytically than it is for them 
to interact with other religions with which they are not socially 
engaged. This explains why the believer finds his/her particular 
religion more reasonable than other traditions. For the believer, 
other traditions are mere ideas that can be manipulated and re-
futed.  
This idea, that beliefs exist in separate networks, has also 
been studied by Michael Shermer and claims that our brains 
have different “modules” or “compartments.” He writes, “… our 
logic-tight compartments are influenced by our moral emotions, 
which lead us to bend and distort data and evidence through a 
process called motivated reasoning.”38 Essentially, we pick and 
choose facts that support preconceived beliefs, showing how a 
belief can exist in one of these modules—safe and sound from 
one’s own critical rigor. 
These studies and the argument I’ve put forward directly 
form the cognitive model that I am proposing. Furthermore, in 
order for custom to influence religious belief, such beliefs must 
be transferred from one person to another via social means and 
avoid critical examination. This model shows how social custom 
protects religious beliefs when being transferred from neighbor 
to neighbor, parent to child. When such a belief is accepted, it is 
active in the brain as a point of social cognition, while outside 




I will now briefly look at two implications of my two-
pronged approach, the first of which is how this relates back to 
Hume and Spinoza’s view that religious belief has its origins in 
the passions, specifically fear and hope. The second is for a pop-
ular argument in the New Atheist movement known as the 
“outsider test for faith.” 
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Hume and Spinoza 
 
For Hume, fear and hope is what first agitated humans to 
make an “inference concerning invisible intelligent power.”40 
This is because humans were initially too primitive to be driven 
by passions such as “speculative curiosity” or “the pure love of 
truth.”41 Spinoza finds any religion to be superstition,42 and that 
in “desperation” one loses all “solid judgment” and “fluctuate[s] 
wretchedly between hope and fear.”43 It is due to this fluctuation 
between passions that allows one to readily believe anything, 
according to Spinoza.44  
Despite their different approaches to the issue of religion, 
both Hume and Spinoza appear to find that fear and hope play a 
vital role in coming to religious belief. Though Hume is speaking 
of the origins of polytheism,45 and Spinoza is attending to why 
humans practice religious rituals,46 they both recognize the emo-
tional drives behind these beliefs and actions. My own account 
of religious belief gives credit to their initial arguments. On the 
cognitive model I presented it is clear that religious belief is a 
phenomenon of the DMN where emotional cognitive processing 
takes place. However, it is not clear based on the model what 
specific emotion(s) are initially present. While my model can 
give an initial reason for supporting Hume and Spinoza, com-
plete validation rests upon further scholarship. 
Furthermore, another area of future scholarship is with re-
gard to Hume’s first path of inquiry: what role does reason play 
in the foundation of religious belief?47 This cognitive model 
questions whether or not reason has a foundation in religion, or 
if reason is an after-the-fact consideration with regards to reli-
gious belief. In addition, given the reciprocal inhibition, it is un-
clear to what extent reason can fully grapple with one’s own reli-
gious beliefs. However, this issue is not within the scope of this 
paper. 
 
The “Outsider Test for Faith” 
 
The  second implication  concerns  New Atheist  John  W. 
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Loftus’ “outsider test for faith.”48 Loftus asks religious believers 
to test their own “beliefs as if [they] were an outsider to the faith 
[they] are evaluating.”49 One can easily apply this by thinking to 
themselves, “Would this reason convince me if someone from 
another faith gave it?” In addition to being a strong rebuttal to 
religious objections, the test is also a tried concept and has stood 
up against many objections.50 The model presented in this paper 
helps explain why the “outsider test for faith” is difficult for the 
religious believer because of custom’s influence. Custom has 
kept believers from truly dealing with their own religious beliefs 
as they would deal with other religious beliefs and could poten-





The twin approaches of custom and cognition I’ve used in 
this paper gives a potential explanation for religious belief. First 
I showed how social custom plays a role in the passing down of 
religious belief by giving an analysis of Mill’s account of custom 
in On Liberty. Second I showed how social cognition plays a role 
in religious belief by first explaining why religious believers find 
their particular religion more reasonable than other religions and 
used that answer to form a cognitive model for religious belief. I 
also briefly looked at how this account relates to Hume and Spi-
noza, as well as the New Atheist argument called the “outsider 
test for faith.” I believe the greatest strength of this paper is the 
empirically testable cognitive model for religious belief. Howev-
er, there are many topics that have not been considered due to 
the scope of this paper. Therefore, it should be viewed as a 
jumping off point for new avenues of scholarship including but 
not limited to, the process of belief transfer, the role of reason in 
religious belief, accuracy of historical accounts of religious belief, 
and how this model could be related to belief more generally 
outside the realm of religion. 
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